MINIMUM WAGE HIKES AND EMPLOYMENT TRANSITIONS IN BRAZIL by Fabio Veras Soares
Minimum wage hikes and Employment Transitions in Brazil
1 




This paper investigates the effect of the minimum wage on employment transitions in Brazil and, in 
particular, on the  informal sector  transitions.  We  estimate  the  probability  of becoming nonemployed 
(unemployed  or  out  of  the  labour  force)  and  the  probability  of  moving  to  the  informal  sector  after 
minimum wage hikes. We estimate these effects separately for periods with high and low inflation to 
assess how agents react to minimum wage hikes under different inflationary expectations, particularly, 
under different degrees of wage indexation. Workers affected by minimum wage increases are compared 
with similar workers further up in the wage distribution. In order to account for heterogeneity between the 
treated minimum wage workers and the comparison groups we use a difference-in-differences approach 
that compares treated and comparison groups in periods with nominal increase in the minimum wage with 
periods with no increase. In this last case the comparison and treated groups are defined as if there had 
been an increase in the minimum wage (pseudo-experiment). Such strategy is applied in a parametric way 
via probit estimates and also in a nonparametric way using kernel propensity score matching method. Our 
findings suggested that disemploymet effects were more likely to be observed in the late 1990´s than in 
the early 1980´s.  This negative effect affects in 1990 affects both informal and formal workers, but it is 
not a characteristic of all minimum wage hike episodes. We also find no robust evidence that minimum 
wage hikes lead to transitions from the formal to the informal sector. 
Keywords: Minimum wage, employment transitions, informality, propensity score matching. 
 
RESUMO 
Este artigo investiga o efeito do salário mínimo sobre transições de emprego no Brasil, em particular, 
sobre  o  setor  informal.  Estimamos  a  probabilidade  de  um  trabalhador  se  tornar  não-empregado 
(desempregado ou sair da força de trabalho) e a probabilidade de transitar do setor informal para o formal 
depois de aumentos do salário mínimo. Este efeitos são estimados separadamente para período de alta e 
baixa  inflação  para  testar  como  os  agentes  reagiram  a  aumentos  do  salário  mínimo  sob  diferentes 
expectativas  inflacionárias  e  sob  diferentes  regras  de  indexação  salarial.  Trabalhadores  diretamente 
afetados por aumentos do salário mínimo são comparados com trabalhadores similares marginalmente 
acima  deles  na  distribuição  de  salários.  A  fim  de  controlar  pelo  efeito  da  heterogeneidade  entre 
trabalhadores afetados pelo aumento e trabalhadores no grupo de comparação, utilizamos o procedimento 
de  diferenças  em  diferenças  que  compara  indivíduos  submetidos  ao  tratamento  com  o  grupo  de 
trabalhadores logo acima deles em períodos com aumentos nominais e em períodos sem aumento. Neste 
último caso, grupos de tratamento e comparação são definidos com se tivesse ocorrido um aumento do 
salário mínimo (pseudo-experimento). Esta estratégia é aplicada tanto de forma paramétrica via probit 
como também de forma não paramétrica através de kernel propensity score matching. Nossos resultados 
sugerem que efeitos negativos do salário mínimo sobre o emprego foram mais prováveis no final dos anos 
90 do que no início dos anos 80, mas não ocorreu em todos os episódios de aumento do salário minimo 
(basicamente ocorre em 1996 e 1998). Este efeito negativo afeta tanto os trabalhadores informais do que 
os  formais.  Nós  também  não  encontramos  nenhuma  evidência  robusta  de  que  aumentos  do  salário 
mínimo levem a transições do setor formal para o informal.  
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The minimum wage has been singled out in the literature as one of the causes of segmentation
3 between 
formal and informal sector workers in developing countries (Behrman,1999). The idea is that the informal 
sector is not covered by the minimum wage policy or that compliance is not enforced is that sector. Thus 
minimum wage hikes would lead to an increase in the informal sector because small firms that could not 
afford the wage increase would start hiring workers with a wage lower than the minimum wage
4 in the 
informal sector.  
As seen in Soares(2004), the degree of non-compliance with the minimum wage decreased a lot from 
1981 to 1999 in Brazil. In the informal sector the non-compliance fell from 61% to 35% in the informal 
sector and from 7% to 1% in the formal sector. Possibly this happened due to the fall in the real value of 
the minimum wage over this period. The high level of non-compliance in the informal sector has led 
some to believe, that minimum wage hikes were irrelevant for the determination of the wage of those 
workers. However, some models on the effect of the minimum wage in the covered and non-covered 
sectors challenged this common sense. Welch (1974) develops a model with two sectors: one covered by 
the minimum wage and the other not covered. In his model, minimum wage hikes lead to both an increase 
in the non-covered sector and a reduction in the participation rate, since workers for whom the new 
(lower) equilibrium wage in the non-covered sector is below their reservation wage would withdraw from 
the labour market. Mincer (1976) extends this model to allow the existence of unemployment. In his 
model the effect of minimum wage hikes on the non-covered sector will depend whether the turnover rate 
is higher or lower than the elasticity of demand in the protected sector. If it is higher, than the non-
covered wage will increase, as workers would queue for covered jobs. If its lower, the wage in the non-
covered sector would fall, as workers migrate to this sector.  
Thus, workers affected by minimum wage hikes can move to different states after the increase. Minimum 
wage  hikes  can  affect  transitions  to  the  informal  sector,  to  unemployment,  to  inactivity  and  even 
transitions  from  inactivity  to  unemployment.  What  happens  with  a  worker’s  mobility  pattern  after  a 
minimum wage hike is mainly an empirical question.  
Besides having a sizable informal sector, the Brazilian labour market has special features that make the 
study of the impact of the minimum wage on the labour market even more complex. First, the formal 
sector  during  the  1980’s  and  the  first  half  of  the  1990’s  followed  strict  rules  of  wage  indexation 
determined  centrally  by  the  federal  government.  In  addition,  during  this  period  there  was  a  high 
concentration of formal sector workers around multiples of the minimum wage, so that the spike on the 
value of minimum wage in the distribution of wages was not unique. Thus, minimum wage hikes were 
quite likely to have spillover effect in the wage distribution of formal sector workers. For the informal 
sector, such spikes were not observed in the 1980’s. However, since 1995 there has been an increasing 
indexation  of  their  wages  to  the  minimum  wage.  Furthermore,  it  has  been  observed  that  a  higher 
proportion  of  informal  sector  workers  have  received  wages  increases  equal  to  the  increase  of  the 
minimum wage than formal sector workers. Therefore, the minimum wage policy in Brazil is likely to 
have a direct effect on informal sector workers, at least, in the second half of the 1990’s, in addition to the 
indirect effect pointed out in models like the ones developed by Welch (1974) and Mincer (1976).  
In this paper we will investigate the effect of the minimum wage hikes on employment transitions in 
Brazil. We will estimate the probability of becoming nonemployed (unemployed or out of the labour 
force) and the probability of moving from the formal to the informal sector after minimum wage hikes
5. 
Workers affected by minimum wage increases are compared with similar workers further up the wage 
distribution. In order to control for heterogeneity between the treated minimum wage workers and the 
comparison groups we use a difference-in-differences approach that compares treated and comparison 
                                                            
3See for instance Rauch’s (1991). 
4We are assuming that the cost of non-compliance is higher for large firms, since they are more easily caught by inspection 
than small firms. 
5We estimate these effects for the joint sample of formal and informal sector workers and separately for each sector.   2 
groups in periods with nominal increases in the minimum wage with periods with no increase. In this last 
case the comparison and treated groups are defined as if there had been an increase in the minimum wage 
(pseudo-experiment). This strategy is applied in a parametric way via probit and also in a nonparametric 
way using kernel propensity score matching methods.  
The findings suggested that disemploymet effects were more likely to be observed in the late 1990´s than 
in the early 1980´s.  This negative effect affects in 1990 affects both informal and formal workers, but it 
is not a characteristic of all minimum wage hike episodes. We also find no robust evidence that minimum 
wage  hikes  lead  to  transitions  from  the  formal  to  the  informal  sector.  Methodologically,  probit  and 
propensity score matching difference-in-difference approaches do not differ much in their estimates.  
2. A Tale of Two Decades and Two Sectors 
The  role  of  the  minimum  wage  in  Brazil  as  a  reference  for  wages  in  the  formal  sector  is  a  major 
characteristic of the distribution of wages in Brazil due to the wage policy of the 1980’s. However, its 
role as an index was not restricted to the formal sector. In this regard, there are two very different phases. 
One between 1982 and 1985 when the minimum wage was an index for the formal sector, and had little - 
if any - impact on the wage distribution of the informal sector, and the period 1995 - 1999, when the 
minimum wage seems to be much more important for the determination of the wages in the informal 
sector than in the formal sector. One possible explanation for this phenomenon was the fall in the real 
value of the minimum wage observed during the 1980’s and the first half of the 1990’s.  
To illustrate these changes we will analyse the kernel densities of the log wages in May 1985 and in May 
1995  and  also  the  wage  changes  by  percentiles  in  periods  of  minimum  wage  increases.  These  two 
minimum wage hike episodes are representative of the effects of minimum wage on the wage distribution 
for the early 1980’s and for the late 1990’s, respectively
6. Figure 1 and Figure 2 show the distribution of 
log wages in the month before (April) and in the month after (May) a minimum wage increase for formal 
and informal sector workers in 1985 and 1995. The data come from the PME (Monthly Employment 
Survey) for the six main metropolitan areas.
7 The three bars in the graphs correspond (from left to right) 
to the minimum wage, to two times the minimum wage and to three times the minimum wage. Figure 1 
reveals that the minimum wage produces a spike at its value in the distribution of wages for formal sector 
workers, and a second less pronounced mass at the value of two minimum wages. Moreover, there was a 
clear shift to the right from one month to the other after the minimum wage increase. The graphs in the 
second row of this figure show that this sort of truncation did not exist in the informal sector due to the 
high degree of non-compliance. More than a half of the informal sector workers earned less than the 
minimum wage in 1985. Nonetheless there is a spike at the value of the minimum wage, but not at its 
multiples.  
Figure 2 differs from Figure 1 in several ways. First, non-compliance dropped considerably among both 
formal and informal sector workers between 1985 and 1995. Second, the most important spike in the 
wage distribution of formal sector workers occurs at two times the value of the minimum wage in 1995. 
There  is  still  a  spike  at  the  minimum  wage  but  it  is  less  pronounced,  particularly,  in  April  1995. 
Surprisingly, the graphs for the informal sector in 1995 resembles the ones for the formal sector in 1985. 
There is a spike at the minimum wage and a second spike at the value of two times the minimum wage. 
Moreover,  there  was  a  clear  shift  to  the  right  of  the  distribution  after  the  minimum  wage  increase. 
Therefore,  the  minimum  wage  seems  to  have  affected  the  distribution  of  wages  in  both  formal  and 
informal sectors. However, during the late 1990’s, it seems that the minimum wage became much more 
important for the distribution of wages in the informal than in the formal sector.  
 
                                                            
6Whenever there is a significant difference between the results we get for these two specific years and the other years that they 
are meant to represent, we will comment on the differences. However, most of the stylised facts found for these two years also 
apply for similar years in the 1980’s and in the 1990’s. 
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Figure 2. Kernel Density of Log Wages: 1995 
In order to analyze the impact of minimum wage hikes on the entire wage distribution, Figure 3 plots the 
monthly increases in the average wage for each percentile (diff1) and compares them with the nominal 
minimum wage increase in May 1985 and May 1995 (the upper horizontal line in the graphs) for formal 
and informal workers, separately. In the case of absence of spillover effect, we expect to see spikes 
equivalent to the minimum wage hike for percentiles whose average wage are close to the minimum wage 
and no effect for highest percentiles. Due to the possibility that we would be capturing spurious increases 
in wages we also apply a differences-in-differences approach that controls for the variation in months   4 
surrounding the minimum wage increase: diff2 and diff3. For 1985, diff2 is the difference between the 
increase in the mean of the percentile in the month after the minimum wage hike (June) and the month 
before the minimum wage hike (April), and diff3 is the difference between the increase in the mean of the 
percentile in the month after the minimum wage increase (May) and the average mean increase one 
month before (April) and one month after the minimum wage hike (June). For the period 1995, diff2 is the 
difference between the increase in the mean of the percentile in the month after the minimum wage 
increase (May) and the average mean increase one month before(April) and one month after (June) the 
minimum wage hike
8, and diff3 is the difference in the increase in the mean of the percentile in the month 
after the minimum wage increase and five months later (October)
9.  
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Figure 3. Wage Change by Percentiles due to Minimum Wage Increase: 05/1985 and 05/1995 
From the graphs in Figure 3 we can observe many contrasts between the percentile wage variation for 
formal  and  informal  workers.  First,  the  minimum  wage  hike  in  May  1985  had  no  impact  on  wage 
increases in the informal sector. The percentiles close to the minimum wage (first vertical line from left to 
right) had a 50% increase - the larger increase observed for all percentiles -, whereas the minimum wage 
increased by 100% (in nominal terms). Second, formal sector workers in the lower percentiles of the 
distribution had wage increases equal to the increase of the minimum wage (this can be seen by the flat 
upper line in the graphs). Notice that in general this flat portion of the graph coincides with the vertical 
line on the left that indicates the first percentile whose average wage is equal to the minimum wage. This 
coincidence in nominal increases occurred in both periods. Third, in May 1995 many percentiles at the 
lower end of the wage distribution for informal sector workers had wage increases equal to the minimum 
wage. This represents a completely change in relation to May 1985. Actually, more percentiles in the 
wage distribution for informal sector workers had wage increases equal to the increase in the minimum 
wage than in the formal sector
10.  
At a first glance, the graphs suggest that spillover effects were more likely to happen in 1995 than in 
1985
11. However, this only means that in the month of a minimum wage increase during the 1980’s only 
the percentiles directly affect by the minimum wage seems to show an expressive positive variation. 
                                                            
8Note the definition of diff2 for 1995 corresponds to the definition of diff3 for 1985. 
9As there was an increase in the minimum wage in November 1985, we cannot apply the control group diff3 as defined for the 
year 1995, i.e, using months well ahead the May minimum wage hike, as a control group for the year 1985. 
10This phenomenon was first reported in Neri(1997). 
11Actually the figures for minimum wage increases from 1995 onwards show even stronger spillover effects.   5 
Nothing  prevents  that  the  other  percentiles  catch  up  with  the  minimum  wage  increase  over  time. 
Nevertheless, this indicates that during the 1980’s every minimum wage increase in the very short run 
implied that the relative wage of minimum wage workers did increase.  
As for indexation of multiples of the minimum wage for both minimum wage hike episodes reported in 
the graphs, May 1985 and May 1995, there is no clear spike at two times the value of the minimum wage. 
However, graphs not shown here reveal that from 1996 onwards there is a spike equal to the increase in 
the minimum wage near the percentile correspondent to two times the minimum wage. Thus, it seems that 
multiples of the minimum wage in the late 1990’s were much more indexed to it than in the 1980’s.  
3. Methodology:  Difference-in-Differences with Pseudo-Experiment 
The only difference between the traditional difference-in-difference approach and one with a pseudo-
experiment is that in the standard case, the treated group is defined regardless of the existence of the 
treatment or not. For instance, union workers can be defined as the  treated group in  the case of an 
evaluation of a major union-rights reform: both unionized and non-unionized workers (comparison group) 
are clearly observed and defined before and after the treatment without any trick. This does not occur in 
the case of an evaluation of the effects of a minimum wage increase. In this case, one has to pretend that 
there had been a minimum wage increase in the period used as baseline (before or some time after the 
minimum wage increase) in order to define the treated group - workers between two different minimum 
wages - and the correspondent comparison group - workers marginally further up in the wage distribution. 
The (pseudo)increase used to define the treated and control group is arbitrary, which means that one can 
use different “(pseudo) minimum wage increases” in order to generate the counterfactual for the “actual 
minimum wage increase”. 
12 
A common characteristic of the strategies based on the idea of differences-in-differences with pseudo-
experiment is that they rely on parametric models - mostly linear probability models, logit or probit 
analysis - in order to measure the impact of minimum wage hikes on both treated and comparison groups. 
The caveats of these parametric models in dealing with comparisons between treated and comparison 
groups  are  well-known.  First  there  is  the  problem  of  the  lack  of  common  support  for  treated  and 
comparison groups. This feature implies that the estimation of the effect of the minimum wage relies on 
linear (or other assumed functional form) extrapolations to evaluate the impact over regions where there 
is no available counterfactual in the comparison group for the treated group
13. Second, in a difference-in-
difference  context,  changes  in  group  composition  over  time  may  lead  to  an  imbalance  between  the 
observed  characteristics  of  both  comparison  and  treated  groups  after  the  treatment  rendering  the 
comparison  meaningless
14.  Due  to  these  shortcomings,  this  paper  also  applies  a  propensity  score 
matching method to evaluate the impact of the minimum wage on employment transitions. In doing so, 
we will be building comparison groups that are more reliable than the ones available for the parametric 
analysis
15.  
In a difference-in-differences framework both unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity and common time 
effects between treated and comparison groups could be eliminated by taking the differences between 
them in two different time periods, one period under the effect of the treatment and another period when 
the treatment did not occur, but when appropriate treated and control groups can be defined (pseudo-
experiment), and then taking the difference of these differences.  
The common trend assumption underlying the differences-in-differences approach implies that changes in 
                                                            
12 For the period 1995-1999 we will apply to different pseudo-experiment to assess the impact of the minimum wage. For the 
period 1982-1985 this is not possible as the minimum wage was increased every 6 months. The availability of a pseudo-
experiment far from the episode of a minimum wage hike is particular interesting for it avoid the problems of data 
contamination and/or anticipation effects when we only use a pair of months before the minimum wage increase. 
13See Smith and Todd (2003) for an in-depth discussion of this issue. 
14See Blundell et al. (2001) for the importance to control for compositional effects in a difference-in-differences context. 
However, this difficulty can be overcome in a parametric framework by using changes in the characteristics rather than the 
characteristics themselves as explanatory variables in case one has access to a panel. 
15Brown (1999) argues that most of the early studies that applied difference-in-differences to the evaluate minimum wage 
effect had built naive comparison groups. In fact, when using workers further up the wage distribution the reliability of the 
comparison group is even more difficult to prove due to possible existence of both substitution and spill-over effects.   6 
the outcome in the absence of a minimum wage hike for treated workers should be the same as the change 
observed for workers in the control group:  
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Where I is an indicator for treatment (I=1, treated and I=0 comparison) and Y is an the outcome of 
interest and t’<t. 
The propensity score matching is necessary in order to make the chosen comparison group as similar as 
possible to the treated group. Thus the first step when applying matching is to estimate the propensity 
score associated to the treated group, which can be done parametrically via probit or logit estimation. The 
second step is to calculate the common support where the average treatment effect can be defined, based 
on the overlap region of distribution of the propensity scores for both treated and control groups. Finally, 
the third step is to  build the estimator of the impact of the policy change 
The differences-in-differences estimates in the non-parametric case will be based on kernel methods. The 
kernel propensity score matching builds the counterfactual based on a kernel weighted average over a set 
of individuals in the control group:  
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, where  () K .  is a 
kernel  function  and  n h   is  a  bandwidth  parameter,  this  function  gives  weight  to  the  comparison 
observations according to its distance in terms of propensity score in relation to the treated observations. 
Heckman  et  al.(1997)  show  that  under  standard  conditions  on  the  bandwidth  and  the  kernel
16,  the 
counterfactual generated by this method is a consistent estimator of the non-observed counterfactual: 
0 ( ( ) 1) E Y P X I | , = . The choice of the kernel and of its bandwidth will determine the number of control 
observations used to match each treated individual and the weight
17 with which each control observation 
will enter the calculation of the counterfactual. The Gaussian kernel, for instance, is unbounded which 
means that all control observations enter the calculation. In this paper we use a Epanechnikov kernel with 
constant bandwidth chosen according to Silverman’s rule of thumb.  
The  problem  here  is  how  to  determine  the  common  support  for  the  two  periods  of  time  under 
consideration,  t  and  t′.  One  strategy  would  be  to  calculate  the  propensity  score  for  the  aggregate 
( 1 ) P I X = | , including observations of  t and  t′ and ignoring that we would be pooling together the 
composition of the treated group in two different points in time. This procedure ignores the fact that the 
composition of the treated group after the treatment may have changed. Another alternative is to try to 
balance the distribution of  X  among the four cells, which means that we must take into account that  X  
is also distributed between t and t′. Blundell et al. (2001) suggest that besides the usual propensity score 
( 1 ) P I X = | , the probability of being observed in period t (after the treatment),  ( 1 ) P t X = | , should also 
be used in the matching process
18.  
We apply two matching procedures to our data. Following Blundell et al. (2001), first we use Euclidean 
Distance to combine the two propensity scores in the search for the closest matching for the NN matching 
case. Second we estimate a kernel estimator. We multiply the two kernel weights that we get from the two 
                                                            
16These conditions require that  () K .  integrates to one, has mean zero and that  0 n h →  as n → ∞ and  n nh → ∞ . 
17The  weight  of  each  control  observation  decreases  with  its  distance  from  the  treated  observation  as  measured  by  their 
propensity scores. 
18Smith  and  Todd(2000)  put  forward  a  procedure  to  estimate  the  common  support  region.  Basically  they  argue  that  the 
intersection of the two densities with some trimming for very low probabilities should be selected. However, the widely used 
user-written programs in Stata pscore.ado and attk.ado define the common support in a simpler way. Nonetheless they differ 
between them in the way that the distribution is trimmed. While psmatch.ado excludes those observations in the treated group 
whose probability (or linear index) is not within the common support, attk.ado excludes those observations in the control group 
whose probability (or linear index) is not within the common support. In this paper we exclude both treated and control 
observations that are not within the common support. We believe that this procedure is much more in line with Smith and Todd 
(2000) idea than the former ones.   7 
propensity scores for each observation on the treated group, and divide its product by the product of their 
constant bandwidth given by 
( 0 2) 1 06 xN σ
− . . .  
As  for  the  choice  of  comparison  group,  even  using  the  propensity  score  matching  we  face  some 
challenges due to the specificity of a minimum wage treatment. In the perfect competition framework, the 
traditional theory of labour demand assumes that an increase in a binding minimum wage renders workers 
whose productivity is below the newly set value unemployable. Thus minimum wage increases would 
tend to increase non-employment either through increases in inactivity or in unemployment. A potential 
problem for the construction of good comparison groups for minimum wage workers is the fact that 
workers marginally further up the wage distribution can be close substitutes for minimum wage workers 
so that their employment probability can be (positively) affected by an increase in the minimum wage, 
depending on the elasticity of substitution between the two groups and on the magnitude of the increase.  
If this is the case, the outcome trend before and after the treatment cannot be the same for both groups and 
(negative) minimum wage effects (on the treated) would be overestimated. The assumption here is that 
the difference in the outcome between the treated and the comparison groups should be constant in the 
absence of the treatment, so that the comparison group would offer a good approximation of what would 
have  been  the  outcome  for  the  treated  group  in  the  absence  of  the  experiment  -  an  increase  in  the 
minimum wage.  
Kramarz and Phillipon (2000) point out that the demand for workers in the comparison group must not 
vary with changes in the minimum wage. One alternative control group would be workers who earn well 
above minimum wage workers, but in this case workers in the control group would not be comparable to 
minimum wage earners since their observable and unobservable characteristics would be quite different, 
making even worse the problem of lack of common support
19. Testing whether or not comparison groups 
are  affected  by  minimum  wage  hikes  is  important  in  the  sense  that  depending  on  the  elasticity  of 
substitution  between  treated  and  comparison  groups  used  in  the  analysis,  we  can  be  over-  or 
underestimating the effect of the minimum wage. Kramarz and Phillipon (2000) put forward a test of the 
quality of the comparison group through the difference in elasticities of employment probability during 
minimum wage hikes and during pseudo-minimum wage hikes - the difference between the elasticities 
calculated in these two periods should be small and statistically insignificant for the control group to be 
considered a good one. This is particularly important in the case of Brazil, since as pointed out in the last 
section, there has been a history of wage indexation in relation to both inflation rate and minimum wage 
increases
20. In this paper we also evaluate the appropriateness of the comparison group. 
 
4. Data 
The  microdata  used  in  this  paper  comes  from  the  Brazilian  Monthly  Employment  Survey  (PME) 
published by IBGE (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica). The PME collects monthly data in a 
similar way of the American CPS. Each household stays in the sample for 4 months, then “rests” for 8 
months, and finally returns for extra 4 months. A worrying limitation of the PME is that the individual is 
asked about his/her monthly wage in the last month, and not in the month of the interview. Moreover, if 
the individual is unemployed or inactive in the month of the interview, he/she is not asked about the wage 
in the previous month. Thus, even if he/she had a job in  1 t − , we do not have information about his/her 
wage. For this reason, we do not know the wage of an individual who became unemployed in a month of 
a minimum wage increase, so we assume that his/her wage in the month previous to the minimum wage 
increase was equal to his/her wage in the month previous to that. This means that for an unemployed 
individual in t (month with minimum wage increase), the wage in  1 t −  is assumed, in our analysis, to be 
                                                            
19This problem is quite common in approaches that contrast the probability of employment in t  for individuals that in  1 t −  
earned between the old and the new minimum wage with the probability of employment of all other workers, the general 
procedure to  overcome  the criticism of bad  quality  comparison  group  has  been the  inclusion  of  dummies  for  the  group 
marginally above the minimum wage and testing whether the impact was different for this group and the treated one, see for 
instance Currie and Fallick (1996) and Abowd et. al (1997). 
20As seen in last section, spillover effect does not seem to be a major problem in Brazilian data. Lemos (2002) and Soares 
(2002b)also find small spillover effects beyond the 10th percentile of the wage distribution.   8 
equal to the wage in  2 t − . For the individuals who are employed in t we do observe their wages in  1 t − .  
Our outcome variables are non-employment
21, unemployment, out of the labour force, non-registered 
(informal) and self-employed status in t, after the real or the pseudo increase in the minimum wage. For 
the period 1995 to 1999 the minimum wage was increased every May. So we will compare transitions 
between April and May ( 1) t =  with transitions for the pair of months immediately before: March to April 
and for a pair of months 5 months ahead of the last increase, the pair September/October. The treated 
group is made up of workers who earn between the current minimum wage and the new one, and the 
comparison groups are made up of workers who earn between the new minimum wage and twice the 
current one. For the September/October pair the pseudo-increase is equal to the increase that would be 
observed in May of the following year. Treated individual are the ones who earn between the current 
minimum wage and the future one, and control group individuals are the ones who earn between the 
future minimum wage and twice the current one.  
5. Results 
5.1. The period 1982-1985 
Probit Analysis 
All  probit  regressions  were run  with  the  following  controls:  gender,  age,  age  squared,  six  education 
groups, region, and industry. The coefficients of interest is the interaction between the month of the 
minimum wage increase and the treated group (t*m) that gives us the sign of the difference in difference, 
i.e, whether or not workers affected by the minimum wage increases had a different (worse) transition 
pattern in the labour market in the month of the increase when compared to similar comparison groups. A 
positive and significant coefficient indicates that treated observations were affected by the  minimum 
wage in the expected direction, i.e, the minimum wage hike caused disemployment or transitions to the 
informal sector or to self-employment, according to the specification in use.  
Table 1 brings the results for the pooled sample of formal and informal workers and for each group 
separately of the marginal effect of the interaction term of the dummy for the treated group and the 
dummy for the month after the minimum wage increase t*m
22. For the nonemployment equation there is 
no clear pattern for the sign of the marginal effect of interaction term: two out of eight coefficients 
display an unexpected negative sign, but only the one for May 1984 is statistically significant at 5%, 
which means that after the minimum wage increase there was a reduction in transitions to unemployment 
for  treated  workers  when  compared  to  the  comparison  group  in  that  episode.  The  other  6  positive 
estimates are not statistically significant. All in all, it seems that minimum wage increases had no impact 
on the probability of moving from employment to nonemployment in the period 1982 - 1985, when using 
this specific comparison group. Not surprisingly, the estimates for both the probability of transition to 
unemployment and the probability of transition to inactivity (out of the labour force) do not show any 
clear effect either. Only the increase of the minimum wage in November 1983 seems to have had a 
positive and significant impact on transitions to inactivity (1.7%).  
As for the sample of formal sector workers, the results are quite similar to the previous one for the whole 
sample. There is no evidence that minimum wage hikes increase the probability that treated workers 
move from employment to nonemployment relative to their control counterparts.  
      Pooled  Formal  Informal 
  Dep. Variable  Variable  t*m  z    t*m  z     t*m  z 
1982 Transitions to:                            
  Non-employment May  -0.003 [0.43]  May  -0.002 [0.19] May  -0.016 [0.74] 
  Unemployment  (N=16369) -0.001 [0.12]  (N=12720) -0.001 [0.21] (N=3647) -0.003 [0.22] 
                                                            
21Non-employment state consists in the the sum of unemployment and out of the labour force states. 
22Results  not  reported  here  show  that  the  marginal  effects  of  the  dummy  for  the  treated  group  tend  to  be  positive  and 
significant (but not always), this result means that workers between the old and the new minimum wage are more likely to 
move to nonemployment than the control group even without the presence of the treatment, i.e, even without the minimum 
wage hike.   9 
  Inactivity     -0.002 [0.35]    0.000 [0.04]    -0.011 [0.69] 
  Non-employment Nov  0 [0.01]  Nov  0.004 [0.54] Nov  -0.014 [0.67] 
  Unemployment  (N=18815) -0.006 [1.37]  (N=15063) -0.003 [0.56] (N=3752) -0.019 [1.66] 
  Inactivity     0.006 [1.18]    0.006 [1.20]    0.008 [0.48] 
1983 Transitions to:                            
  Non-employment May  0.01 [1.26]  May  0.002 [0.28] May  0.037 [1.55] 
  Unemployment  (N=17974)  0.006 [1.16]  (N=14424)  0.002 [0.39] (N=3550)  0.021 [1.52] 
  Inactivity     0.004 [0.74]    0.001 [0.11]    0.018 [1.03] 
  Non-employment Nov  0.016 [1.55]  Nov  0.007 [0.76] Nov  0.044 [1.42] 
  Unemployment  (N=17974)  0.001 [0.10]  (N=13965)  0.001 [0.11] (N=3581)  0.003 [0.20] 
  Inactivity     0.017 [2.08]*   0.007 [0.98]    0.047 [1.81] 
1984 Transitions to:                            
  Non-employment May  -0.023 [2.08]* May  -0.003 [0.23] May  -0.084 [2.70]** 
  Unemployment  (N=16672) -0.008 [1.16]  (N=14389)  0.004 [0.60] (N=3395)  -0.05 [2.76]** 
  Inactivity     -0.013 [1.50]    -0.008 [0.94]    -0.022 [0.96] 
  Non-employment Nov  0.015 [1.23]  Nov  0.011 [1.03] Nov  0.021 [0.48] 
  Unemployment  (N=17202)  0.005 [0.72]  (N=13630)  0.007 [0.94] (N=3572) -0.008 [0.36] 
  Inactivity     0.008 [0.84]    0.003 [0.36]    0.051 [1.30] 
1985 Transitions to:                            
  Non-employment May  0.001 [0.12]  May  -0.008 [1.22] May  0.068 [2.30]* 
  Unemployment  (N=24828) -0.002 [0.35]  (N=20951) -0.005 [1.10] (N=3877)  0.021 [1.17] 
  Inactivity     0.002 [0.48]    -0.003 [0.67]    0.043 [1.92] 
  Non-employment Nov  0.005 [0.43]  Nov  0.009 [0.82] Nov  -0.013 [0.43] 
  Unemployment  (N=17557) -0.001 [0.13]  (N=13949)  0.003 [0.49] (N=3608) -0.012 [0.97] 
   Inactivity     0.005 [0.54]     0.006 [0.68]    -0.002 [0.07] 
*Significant at 5%, **Signifcant at 1%               
Robust z statisitcs in brackets                 
Table 1. Changes in Transition to Non-employment: Probit (1982-1985) 
As for the informal sector workers
23, we find significant marginal effects for the interaction term in May 
1984 and May 1985. However, whereas for 1984 the coefficient is negative, indicating that the minimum 
wage increase made informal treated workers more employable than their control counterparts, in 1985 it 
is positive indicating that there was an increase in transition to non-employment for treated individuals
24. 
But again there is no pattern in the sign of the interactions during this period.  
As for the transitions to informality the only significant interaction terms were found in November 1984 
and November 1985 and with a negative sign, implying that the minimum wage hike led to a reduction in 
transitions to the informal sector (non-registered state). As for transition to self-employment, only the 
interaction term for May 1982 is negative and statistically significant.  
 
      Formal           
  Dep.  Variable  t*m  se       
1982 Transitions to:                
  Informal Sector  May  0.008 [1.02]  Nov  -0.007[1.23] 
  Self-Employment  (N=12720)  -0.002 [2.91]** (N=15063) 0.000[0.20] 
1983 Transitions to:                
                                                            
23Similarly to the pooled sample and the sample for formal workers, results not reported here show that in general treated 
workers are more likely to move to non-employment than their counterparts in the control group. However, this result is not as 
strong as for the former samples. 
24It is interesting to note that whereas the positive effect on nonemployment in 1985 seems to be determined by an increase in 
transitions  to  inactivity,  the  negative  effect  on  nonemployment  of  1984  was  determined  by  a  reduction  in  transitions  to 
unemployment   10 
  Informal Sector  May  -0.004 [0.68]  Nov  0.006[0.69] 
  Self-Employment  (N=14424)  -0.001 [0.68]  (N=13965) 0.002[0.74] 
1984 Transitions to:                
  Informal Sector  May  0.014 [1.27]  Nov  -0.021[2.02]* 
  Self-Employment  (N=14389)  -0.004 [1.25]  (N=13630) -0.001[0.36] 
1985 Transitions to:                
  Informal Sector  May  0.001 [0.07]  Nov  -0.026[2.81]** 
  Self-Employment  (N=20951)  0.004 [1.16]  (N=13949) 0.000[0.13] 
*Significant at 5%, **Significant at 1%             
Robust z statistics in brackets            
Table 2. Changes in Transition to Informality: Probit 
All  in  all,  the  above  results  for  this  sample  period  and  for  the  parametric  methodology  suggest  a 
negligible effect of minimum wage hikes on employment transitions.  
Matching: Kernel-based results 
The specification used to estimate the propensity score for both the treated group  ( 1 ) P I X = |  and for the 
time after treatment  ( 1 ) P t X = |  - to correct for compositional change
25 - was the same that we used for 
the probit estimates.  
The estimates of interest here are the differences between treated and control groups in the probability of 
moving to the nonemployment, unemployment, inactivity, informality and self-employment in the months 
after minimum wage increases when compared to months when the increase did not take place.  
As in the case of the probit estimates, the propensity score matching estimates for the pooled sample do 
not  exhibit  a  common  pattern  on  the  effect  of  nominal  minimum  wage  hikes  on  transitions  to 
nonemployment. Table 3 shows that the sign of the differences in probabilities varies considerably. For 
November 1982 and May 1984 it seems to have occurred a decrease in the probability of nonemployment 
for  treated  workers,  whereas  for  the  other  episodes  over  this  period  there  has  been  an  increase. 
Nevertheless these estimates are only statistically significant for May 1984. This result is similar to the 
one  found  by  the  probit  estimates  of  the  marginal  effect  of  the  difference-in-differences  approach 
(Table 1).  As  for  transitions  to  unemployment  only  the  estimates  for  May  1983  are  positive  and 
significant and for transitions to inactivity there is a statistically significant decrease in May 1984.  
 
  Difference in Differences in Probability 
   Nonemployment  Unemployment  Inactivity 
Pooled sample  estimates  se  estimates se  estimates se 
May-82  0.005 [0.008]  0.001 [0.005]  0.004 [0.006] 
Nov-82  0 [0.006]  -0.007 [0.004]  0.007 [0.005] 
May-83  0.011 [0.007]  0.011 [0.005]**  0 [0.005] 
Nov-83  0.013 [0.008]  0.006 [0.006]  0.007 [0.006] 
May-84  -0.024 [0.009]**  -0.008 [0.007]  -0.015 [0.006]** 
Nov-84  0.009 [0.009]**  0.006 [0.007]  0.003 [0.005] 
May-85  0.012 [0.007]  0.002 [0.004]  0.01 [0.006] 
Nov-85  0.007 [0.010]  0.006 [0.006]  0.001 [0.007] 
Formal sector                   
May-82  0.002 [0.008]  -0.001 [0.006]  0.003 [0.006] 
Nov-82  -0.004 [0.081]  -0.007 [0.005]  0.003 [0.005] 
                                                            
25We do not report the results of the probit estimations used to calculate the propensity score indexes used in the matching 
process. But it is worth mentioning that in general the covariates were not significant in the equation for  ( 1 ) P t X = | , so it 
seems the compositional effects are not a major issue in this particular application.   11 
May-83  0.009 [0.079]  0.01 [0.006]  -0.001 [0.006] 
Nov-83  0.01 [0.009]  0.004 [0.006]  0.005 [0.007] 
May-84  -0.009 [0.011]  0.001 [0.007]  -0.01 [0.008] 
Nov-84  0.003 [0.008]  0.004 [0.007]  -0.002 [0.006] 
May-85  0.006 [0.007]  0.002 [0.004]  0.004 [0.005] 
Nov-85  0.005 [0.008]  0.002 [0.006]  0.002 [0.082] 
Informal sector                   
May-82  -0.017 [0.021]  -0.013 [0.015]  -0.004 [0.017] 
Nov-82  0.02 [0.024]  -0.009 [0.013]  0.029 [0.020] 
May-83  0.041 [0.025]  0.032 [0.017]  0.009 [0.019] 
Nov-83  0.043 [0.027]  0.004 [0.207]  0.039 [0.021] 
May-84  -0.09 [0.029]**  -0.057 [0.021]**  -0.033 [0.023] 
Nov-84  0.008 [0.029]  -0.018 [0.017]  0.026 [0.020] 
May-85  0.024 [0.102]  -0.001 [0.012]  0.025 [0.022] 
Nov-85  -0.023 [0.022]  0.001 [0.013]  -0.024 [0.017] 
*Significant at 5%, **Significant at 1%        
Bootstrapped standard errors          
Table 3.  Changes  in  Transition  to  Non-Employment: Kernel  Propensity  Score  Matching  (1982-
1985) 
As for the sample of formal workers, most of the estimates of differences in the probability of transition 
to  nonemployment  are  positive,  but  there  are  negative  signs  for  November  1982  and  May  1984. 
Nevertheless none of the estimates are statistically significant like in the probit specifications. The same 
lack of pattern occurs again for the decomposition of this transitions into unemployment and inactivity.  
   Difference in Differences in Probability 
   Informality  Self-employment 
Formal  estimates  se  estimates  se 
May-82  0.002 [0.008]  -0.005 [0.002]* 
Nov-82  0.003 [0.006]  -0.001 [0.002] 
May-83  0.001 [0.007]  0.001 [0.003] 
Nov-83  0.002 [0.008]  0.001 [0.002] 
May-84  0.011 [0.011]  -0.004 [0.011] 
Nov-84  -0.016 [0.008]*  -0.001 [0.003] 
May-85  -0.006 [0.006]  -0.003 [0.003] 
Nov-85  -0.027 [0.009]**  0.007 [0.004] 
*Significant at 5%, **Significant at 1% 
Bootstrapped standard errors 
Table 4. Changes in Transition to Informality: Kernel Propensity Score Matching (1982-1985) 
As  for the  sample  of  informal  workers,  most  of  the  estimates of the  difference in  the  transitions to 
nonemployment are positive, but there are some negative estimates: May 1982, May 1984 and November 
1985.  However,  only  the  estimate  for  May  1984
26  is  statistically  significant,  which  means  that  the 
minimum wage hike of May 1984 led to a lower transition to unemployment to treated informal workers 
when compared to the control informal workers.  
As  with  the  probit  estimates,  the  kernel  estimates  of  changes  in  the  probability  of  transition  to  the 
informal sector reported in Table 4 show a statistically significant effect of the minimum wage hike for 
November 1984 and November 1985 with reductions in this outflow as well as a reduction in changes to 
self-employment in May 1982
27. Overall, the results for this period using the kernel estimates do not 
                                                            
26Again this result is in line with the probit estimates. 
27 The only difference between probit and kernel estimates is the reduction into transition to self-employment found in the   12 
diverge much from the result of the probit analysis and point to the absence of negative effect of the 
minimum wage hikes on employment.  
6.2. The  period 1995-1999 
The  period  1995-1999  witnessed  five  minimum  wage  increases.  Unlike  the  period  1982-1985,  the 
minimum wage increased during this period in real terms. The impact of the increase in real terms, 
nonetheless, varied a lot from year to year, but the biggest real increase was in May 1995.  
Besides using the pair of months just before the increase in the minimum wage - March/April - as contrast 
for the pair of months of the increase - April/May, we simulate an increase in the minimum wage between 
September  and  October  and  contrast  the  effect  of  this  pseudo-increase  with  the  actual  increase  of 
April/May. In the pseudo-increase for the pair September/October the treated group is defined as workers 
earning between the current minimum wage and the minimum wage of May of the following year, and 




Table 5 shows that the marginal effect of the interaction t*m alternates positive and negative values when 
the pair of months immediately before the minimum wage increase is used March/April (May), but it is 
always  positive  when  the  pair  September/October  (Oct)  is  used  as  contrast.  However  for  most 
specification the estimates are not significant. Only for 1996 and 1998 the interaction is statistically 
significant and only when the pair September/October is used as contrast
29  
 
      Pooled Sample  Formal Sector  Informal Sector 
   Dep. Variable     t*m  se     t*m  se     t*m  se 
1995 Transtions to:                            
  Nonemployment May  -0.008 [0.73]  May  -0.002 [0.14] May  -0.017 [0.72] 
  Unemployment  (N=11948) -0.004 [0.86]  (N=7714) -0.001 [0.10] (N=4234) -0.007 [0.86] 
  Inactivity    -0.003 [0.34]    0.000  [0.03]    -0.011 [0.49] 
  Nonemployment Oct  0.007  [0.60]  Oct  0.004  [0.31] Oct  0.014  [0.60] 
  Unemployment  (N=13206) 0.000  [0.06]  (N=8456) 0.004  [0.61] (N=4750) -0.004 [0.54] 
   Inactivity     0.007  [0.65]     0.000  [0.01]    0.019  [0.89] 
1996 Transtions to:                            
  Nonemployment May  0.003  [0.24]  May  0.002  [0.15] May  0.01  [0.42] 
  Unemployment  (N=12530) 0.004  [0.65]  (N=7762) 0.005  [0.87] (N=4704) 0.007  [0.59] 
  Inactivity    -0.002 [0.18]    -0.002 [0.22]    0.003  [0.16] 
  Nonemployment Oct  0.027  [2.03]* Oct  0.001  [0.07] Oct  0.06  [2.35]* 
  Unemployment  (N=12084) 0.012  [1.84]  (N=7447) 0.001  [0.24] (N=4637) 0.021  [1.78] 
   Inactivity     0.015  [1.34]     -0.003 [0.28]    0.039  [1.76] 
1997 Transtions to:                            
  Nonemployment May  0.017  [1.14]  May  0.014  [0.95] May  0.016  [0.58] 
  Unemployment  (N=10949) -0.003 [0.43]  (N=6958) 0.015  [1.76] (N=3991) -0.014 [1.47] 
  Inactivity    0.021  [1.59]    0.005  [0.42]    0.04  [1.51] 
  Nonemployment Oct  0.009  [0.63]  Oct  0.005  [0.37] Oct  0.021  [0.78] 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
probit estimates, but not in the Kernel estimates. 
28Notice that the results for October are not a different minimum wage increase as were the results for November for the period 
1982-1985. The results reported on the rows Oct refer to the comparison between transitions from April to May and transitions 
from September to October. 
29As it was the case for the period 1982-1985, estimates not shown here reveal that the treated group is in general more likely 
to move to nonemployment than the control group regardless of minimum wage hikes. Transitions to inactivity rather than 
transitions to unemployment is the major force driving this result.   13 
  Unemployment  (N=11498) -0.002 [0.24]  (N=7146) 0.005  [0.58] (N=4352) -0.007 [0.64] 
   Inactivity     0.009  [0.81]     0.000  [0.01]    0.03  [1.25] 
1998 Transtions to:                            
  Nonemployment May  0.018  [1.27]  May  0.001  [0.10] May  0.034  [1.27] 
  Unemployment  (N=11399) 0.013  [1.57]  (N=6938) 0.001  [0.20] (N=4461) 0.025  [1.59] 
  Inactivity    0.005  [0.41]    -0.001 [0.08]    0.009  [0.41] 
  Nonemployment Oct  0.035  [2.40]* Oct  0.004  [0.27] Oct  0.066  [2.39]* 
  Unemployment  (N=11915) 0.02  [2.14]* (N=7331) 0.009  [1.15] (N=4524) 0.023  [1.49] 
   Inactivity     0.015  [1.31]     -0.004 [0.44]    0.042  [1.77] 
1999 Transtions to:                            
  Nonemployment May  -0.005 [0.35]  May  0.021  [1.25] May  -0.029 [1.17] 
  Unemployment  (N=11300) -0.006 [0.90]  (N=7057) 0.001  [0.19] (N=4243) -0.014 [1.33] 
  Inactivity    0.001  [0.12]    0.021  [1.41]    -0.012 [0.56] 
  Nonemployment Oct  0  [0.03]  Oct  0.005  [0.35] Oct  -0.008 [0.31] 
  Unemployment  (N=11515) 0.002  [0.28]  (N=7244) 0.006  [0.95] (N=4271) -0.004 [0.29] 
   Inactivity     -0.001 [0.12]     0.000  [0.04]    -0.003 [0.16] 
*Significant at 5%, **Significant at 1%. 
Robust z statistics in brackets 
Table 5. Changes in Transition to Non-employment: Probit (1995-1999) 
Decomposing the impact on non-employment into its two components, unemployment and inactivity, we 
find  even  more  volatility  in  the  results  with  the  sign  of  the  interaction  terms  varying  a  lot.  The 
significance  of  the  positive  interaction  term  for  1996
30  and  1998  discussed  above  is  driven  by  the 
transitions to unemployment, which are positive and significant when the pair September/October is used 
as contrast. As for the effect on the probability of moving to inactivity the results of the interaction term 
were never significant.  
As  for  the  formal  sector
31,  the  interaction  term  in  the  nonemployment  equation,  displays  in  general 
positive  coefficients  as  expected,  but  they  are  never  statistically  significant.  Interestingly,  the  large 
nominal  (and  also real) increase in  the  minimum  wage observed in  1995  led  to a  negative  (but  not 
significant) sign for the interaction term when the pair of months just before the increase is used as 
contrast. Looking at the equations for unemployment and inactivity it is striking that the positive - but not 
significant - interaction terms observed for the nonemployment equation can be attributed to the effect of 
minimum  wage  hikes  on  unemployment.  The  coefficients  of  the  interaction  term  on  the  inactivity 
equation display a much more volatile behaviour, changing from positive to negative, from year to year, 
whereas the non-employment equation display positive coefficients for all years, with the exception of 
1995 when the pair March/April is used as contrast.  
For the sample of informal workers, the results are much more in line with the ones found for the pooled 
sample than the ones found for formal workers. The coefficients of the interaction terms where positive 
for all years with the exception of 1995 (when using March/April as contrast) and 1999 (for both pairs of 
contrast).  However,  the  most  interesting  fact  is  that  for  the  year  1996  and  1998  when  the  pair 
September/October is used as contrast the positive coefficient is also statistically significant at 5%. For 
both years, this result seems to be driven by positive changes in the probability of moving to inactivity 
rather than moving to unemployment. Hence, according to the probit estimates, informal sector workers 
were the ones who were hit by minimum wage hikes after 1995.  
As for the probability of moving to the informal sector (non-registered workers) Table 6 shows that again 
there  is  no  pattern.  The  interaction  assumes  positive  and  negative  values,  in  general  statistically 
insignificant, from one year to another. Only in 1995 and in 1998, when the pair September/October is 
                                                            
30In this case the estimate is significant only at 10%. 
31Results not reported here show that the treated group does not necessarily have a higher probability of moving to non-
employment than the comparison group. This result is only observed for 1995 regardless of the pair of months used as control, 
whereas it was observed for most of the years in the period 1982-1985 and for the pooled sample as discussed above. Only 
transitions from employment to inactivity seems to be more likely for the treated group than in the control, even when the 
coefficient is not significant, it is always positive.   14 
used as contrast, we do find positive and significant effect of the minimum wage hike on the probability 
of moving to the informal sector
32. The same lack of pattern also occurs with the probability of moving to 
self-employment. In 1996, the minimum wage hike seems to have increased the probability of becoming 
self-employed
33, while in 1999 it had the opposite effect
34.  
    Formal Sector 
   Dep. Variable   Month/N  t*m  se  Month/N  t*m  se 
1995  Transitions to:                
  Informal Sector  May  -0.007  [0.50]  Oct  0.032  [2.21]* 
  Self-Employment (N=7714)  -0.004  [0.70]  (N=8456)  -0.007  [1.79] 
1996  Transitions to:                
  Informal Sector  May  -0.011  [0.73]  Oct  -0.015  [1.04] 
  Self-Employment (N=7762)  -0.002  [0.36]  (N=7447)  0.021  [1.91] 
1997  Transitions to:                
  Informal Sector  May  -0.002  [0.11]  Oct  -0.023  [1.50] 
  Self-Employment (N=6958)  -0.001  [0.14]  (N=7146)  -0.004  [0.77] 
1998  Transitions to:                
  Informal Sector  May  0.021  [1.16]  Oct  0.042  [2.38]* 
  Self-Employment (N=6938)  0.006  [0.83]  (N=7331)  0.015  [1.68] 
1999  Transitions to:                
  Informal Sector  May  -0.009  [0.54]  Oct  0.003  [0.15] 
  Self-Employment (N=7057)  -0.008  [1.60]  (N=7244)  -0.008  [2.57]* 
*Significant at 5%, **Significant at 1%. 
Robust z statistics in brackets 
Table 6. Changes in Transition to Informality: Probit (1995-1999) 
Matching: Kernel-based results 
According  to  Table 7,  the  estimates  using  propensity  score  matching  kernel  for  both  contrast  pairs, 
March/April and September/October indicate a negative and insignificant impact of minimum wage on 
transitions to non-employment for the pooled sample in 1995. For all other years the estimates show a 
positive effect of the minimum wage hikes on non-employment. This effect is statistically significant for 
1996 regardless of the contrast pair of months, for 1997 (March/April as contrast) and for 1998 (Sept/Oct 
as contrast). These results for the pair Sept/Oct as contrast months are in line with the probit estimates. As 
for the decomposition on transitions to unemployment, the estimates are in general positive, but only in 
1998  is  the  estimate  statistically  significant  and  positive  (regardless  of  the  pair  of  months  used  as 
contrast
35). As for transition to inactivity there is a positive and significant effect only in 1997 when 
March/April is used as contrast.  
   Difference in Differences in Probability 
   Nonemployment  Unemployment  Inactivity 
Pooled sample  estimates  se  estimates se  estimates se 
May-95  -0.008 [0.012]  -0.003 [0.006]  -0.004 [0.011] 
Oct-95  -0.003 [0.012]  0.004 [0.006]  -0.007 [0.011] 
May-96  0.01 [0.014]  0.008 [0.006]  0.002 [0.012] 
Oct-96  0.028 [0.014]*  0.01 [0.007]  0.018 [0.013] 
May-97  0.037 [0.017]*  0.003 [0.007]  0.034 [0.017]* 
Oct-97  0.015 [0.016]  0.004 [0.008]  0.01 [0.015] 
                                                            
32All negative estimates are non-significant. 
33The coefficient is significant at 10%. 
34Both significant effects are only found when the pair September/October is used as contrast. 
35In the probit analysis this result holds only when the pair September/October is used as contrast.   15 
May-98  0.041 [0.016]**  0.015 [0.008]*  0.026 [0.014] 
Oct-98  0.035 [0.015]**  0.019 [0.007]**  0.016 [0.014] 
May-99  0.021 [0.016]  -0.007 [0.007]  0.028 [0.016] 
Oct-99  0.003 [0.014]  0.005 [0.008]  -0.003 [0.014] 
Formal sector                   
May-95  -0.006 [0.011]  0.002 [0.006]  -0.008 [0.108] 
Oct-95  -0.005 [0.015]  0.005 [0.007]  -0.011 [0.013] 
May-96  0.012 [0.013]  0.006 [0.006]  0.006 [0.013] 
Oct-96  0.033 [0.016]*  0.01 [0.008]  0.023 [0.014] 
May-97  0.021 [0.019]  -0.001 [0.010]  0.021 [0.017] 
Oct-97  0.001 [0.021]  0.002 [0.010]  -0.001 [0.019] 
May-98  0.02 [0.018]  0.005 [0.009]  0.0152 [0.016] 
Oct-98  0.013 [0.020]  0.014 [0.012]  0 [0.016] 
May-99  0.015 [0.015]  -0.003 [0.009]  0.018 [0.019] 
Oct-99  0.008 [0.019]  0.009 [0.009]  -0.001 [0.016] 
Informal sector                   
May-95  -0.002 [0.026]  0 [0.014]  -0.002 [0.023] 
Oct-95  -0.007 [0.025]  0.001 [0.012]  -0.008 [0.023] 
May-96  0.02 [0.029]  0.011 [0.011]  0.009 [0.027] 
Oct-96  0.006 [0.026]  0.018 [0.010]  -0.012 [0.023] 
May-97  0.059 [0.031]  0.005 [0.013]  0.053 [0.028] 
Oct-97  0.029 [0.033]  0.011 [0.018]  0.019 [0.029] 
May-98  0.037 [0.023]  0.024 [0.013]  0.013 [0.021] 
Oct-98  0.061 [0.029]*  0.017 [0.012]  0.044 [0.026] 
May-99  0.013 [0.030]  -0.005 [0.016]  0.018 [0.027] 
Oct-99  0.009 [0.029]  -0.004 [0.015]  0.013 [0.026] 
*Significant at 5%, **Signifcant at 1%        
Bootstrapted standard errors          
 
Table 7.  Changes  in  Transition  to  Non-Employment: Kernel  Propensity  Score  Matching  (1995-
1999) 
As for the results for the formal sector, they are quite similar to the ones for the pooled sample in terms of 
sign: negative effects on transitions to nonemployment for 1995 and positive effects for all other years, 
regardless  of  the  pair  of  months  used  as  contrast.  However,  only  for  1996  when  the  pair 
September/October  is  used  as contrast  is the  positive  estimate significant.  None  of  the  estimates  for 
transitions to unemployment and for transitions to inactivity are significant.  
The same pattern of transitions to nonemployment is found in the case of informal workers. Only for 
1995 there was a reduction in transitions to nonemployment. For all other years the estimates are positive. 
However, as was the case for the pooled sample, only for 1998 and when the pair September/October is 
used as contrast the positive estimate is significant. Moreover, none of the estimates for transitions to 
unemployment and for transitions to inactivity are significant.  
As for transitions to informality, Table 8 shows that there is no pattern in the sign of the change. The only 
statistically significant estimate is a negative effect for 1997 when the pair September/October is used as 
contrast. As for transitions to self-employment the positive effect on transitions to self-employment found 
in 1996 when the pair September/October is used as contrast is statistically significant.  
   Difference in Differences in Probability 
   Informality  Self-employment 
Formal  estimates  se  estimates  se 
May-95  -0.0168 [0.015]  0.0004 [0.006]   16 
Oct-95  0.0206 [0.015]  0.0005 [0.006] 
May-96  -0.023 [0.019]  -0.0003 [0.008] 
Oct-96  -0.0213 [0.017]  0.0177 [0.007]** 
May-97  -0.0141 [0.019]  0.0017 [0.008] 
Oct-97  -0.0608 [0.021]**  -0.0015 [0.007] 
May-98  0.0012 [0.022]  0.0024 [0.007] 
Oct-98  0.006 [0.021]  0.0064 [0.006] 
May-99  0.0238 [0.020]  -0.0006 [0.008] 
Oct-99  0.0043 [0.019]  -0.0118 [0.007] 
*Significant at 5%, **Signifcant at 1%     
Bootstrapted standard errors      
 
Table 8. Changes in Transition to Informality: Kernel Propensity Score Matching (1995-1999) 
 Assessing Comparison Groups for the Non-parametric Results 
A  good  comparison  group  should  not  display  any  strong  effect  after  minimum  wage  increases.  For 
instance, if workers marginally further up the wage distribution in relation to the minimum wage are good 
substitutes for minimum wage workers, one should expect their probability of moving to nonemployment 
to decrease, making the effect of the minimum wage even larger. Another possibility is that workers 
whose wages are indexed to the minimum wage would also be “at risk” of losing their jobs. If this were 
the case, the comparison group that includes multiples of minimum wage such as 1.5, 2, 2.5 or 3 times the 
minimum wage would also face a higher probability of moving to nonemployment after minimum wage 
hikes
36. The real figure, however, must be a mixture of these two effects.  
One way to assess how these effects jeopardize the quality of the comparison group is to estimate the 
differences  in  the  probability  of  transition  to  nonemployment  before  and  after  the  minimum  wage 
increase for the comparison group sample. For the comparison group to be of good quality this difference 
must be small (close to zero) and not statistically significant. Tables 9 to 11 bring the results of these 
estimates.  
 
   POOLED SAMPLE 
   Nonemployment  Unemployment  Inactivity 
Kernel estimates  estimates se  estimates se  estimates se 
May-82  -0.013 [0.006]*  -0.006 [0.003]  -0.007 [0.005] 
Nov-82  -0.001 [0.005]  0.001 [0.004]  -0.002 [0.004] 
May-83  -0.009 [0.005]  -0.011 [0.004]**  0.001 [0.004] 
Nov-83  -0.008 [0.007]  -0.003 [0.005]  -0.006 [0.005] 
May-84  0.016 [0.008]*  0.007 [0.006]  0.009 [0.005] 
Nov-84  -0.006 [0.082]  -0.009 [0.007]  0.003 [0.004] 
May-85  -0.01 [0.006]  -0.001 [0.003]  -0.009 [0.003] 
Nov-85  -0.005 [0.009]  -0.009 [0.006]  0.004 [0.006] 
May-95  0.012 [0.009]  0.004 [0.005]  0.008 [0.008] 
Oct-95  0.002 [0.009]  -0.004 [0.005]  0.006 [0.008] 
May-96  0.003 [0.009]  -0.002 [0.004]  0.005 [0.008] 
Oct-96  -0.009 [0.010]  -0.004 [0.004]  -0.005 [0.009] 
May-97  -0.009 [0.011]  0.008 [0.005]  -0.017 [0.011] 
Oct-97  -0.007 [0.011]  -0.001 [0.006]  -0.005 [0.011] 
May-98  -0.038 [0.011]**  -0.01 [0.005]*  -0.028 [0.009]** 
                                                            
36The wage indexation of the 1980’s should have a similar effect. The lack of disemployment effect over this period may be 
due to shifts in the whole wage distribution caused by the indexation rules.   17 
Oct-98  -0.017 [0.009]  -0.007 [0.005]  -0.01 [0.006] 
May-99  -0.028 [0.011]**  -0.003 [0.005]  -0.025 [0.010]** 
Oct-99  0.001 [0.010]  -0.005 [0.005]  0.007 [0.009] 
Table  9  –  Difference  in  Probability  Before  and  After  the  Treatment  for  the  Control  Group  (Pooled 
Sample) 
The results in Tables 9 to 11 suggest that the negative effect in transitions to nonemployment found in 
May 1984 and the positive effect of the minimum wage on transitions to unemployment in May 1983 
were due to statistically significant changes in the probability of transitions for the control group. The 
only robust result is the fall in transitions to self-employment for formal sector workers in May 1982. The 
results  for  the  late  1990’s  are  much  more  robust,  since  only  the  positive  effect  on  transitions  to 
nonemployment  observed  in  1998  does  not  pass  the  test.  The  positive  effect  on  transitions  to 
nonemployment found for 1996 and 1997 are robust to the test of quality of the control group.  
 
   FORMAL SECTOR 
   Nonemployment  Unemployment  Inactivity  Informality  Self-employment 
Kernel Estimates  estimates  se  estimates  se  estimates  se  estimates  se 
estimate
s  se 
May-82  -0.01 [0.006]  -0.005 [0.004]  -0.005 [0.004]  -0.011 [0.006]*  0.003 [0.002] 
Nov-82  0.005 [0.005]  0.002 [0.003]  0.002 [0.004]  -0.006 [0.005]  0.001 [0.002] 
May-83  -0.01 [0.079]  -0.011 [0.005]*  0.001 [0.004]  0.003 [0.005]  -0.002 [0.003] 
Nov-83  -0.007 [0.009]  -0.002 [0.006]  -0.005 [0.082]  -0.003 [0.007]  -0.003 [0.002] 
May-84  0.005 [0.009]  -0.001 [0.005]  0.006 [0.007]  -0.005 [0.010]  0.007 [0.010] 
Nov-84  -0.001 [0.007]  -0.007 [0.006]  0.006 [0.005]  0.015 [0.007]*  0.002 [0.002] 
May-85  -0.008 [0.006]  -0.003 [0.004]  -0.004 [0.005]  0.007 [0.005]  0.003 [0.002] 
Nov-85  0.001 [0.008]  -0.002 [0.005]  0.003 [0.005]  0.037 [0.010]**  -0.01 [0.005]* 
May-95  0.006 [0.008]  0.003 [0.003]  0.003 [0.007]  0.021 [0.010]*  -0.001 [0.005] 
Oct-95  -0.003 [0.009]  -0.004 [0.005]  0.001 [0.008]  0.004 [0.011]  0.001 [0.003] 
May-96  0.003 [0.007]  -0.001 [0.004]  0.004 [0.007]  0.019 [0.012]  0.003 [0.004] 
Oct-96  -0.014 [0.011]  -0.007 [0.006]  -0.008 [0.009]  0.028 [0.011]**  -0.004 [0.005] 
May-97  0.012 [0.014]  0.01 [0.007]  0.002 [0.013]  0.017 [0.010]  -0.002 [0.006] 
Oct-97  0.020 [0.016]  0.003 [0.009]  0.017 [0.014]  0.019 [0.013]  0.000 [0.005] 
May-98  -0.023 [0.013]  -0.003 [0.007]  -0.02 [0.011]  -0.006 [0.013]  -0.004 [0.005] 
Oct-98  -0.013 [0.013]  -0.008 [0.011]  -0.005 [0.008]  0.011 [0.010]  -0.001 [0.005] 
May-99  -0.016 [0.012]  -0.002 [0.005]  -0.015 [0.011]  -0.002 [0.011]  -0.003 [0.006] 
Oct-99  -0.009 [0.012]  -0.008 [0.007]  -0.001 [0.009]  0.009 [0.010]  0.006 [0.005] 
*Significant at 5%, **Significant at 1%                 
Table 10. Difference in Probability Before and After the Treatment for Control Group (Formal 
Sector) 
   Informal Sector 
   Nonemployment  Unemployment  Inactivity 
Kernel estimates  estimates  se  estimates  se  estimates  se 
May-82  -0.001 [0.016]  0.008 [0.010]  -0.009 [0.013] 
Nov-82  -0.033 [0.020]  -0.005 [0.011]  -0.028 [0.017] 
May-83  -0.031 [0.019]  -0.026 [0.015]  -0.004 [0.015] 
Nov-83  -0.039 [0.025]  -0.002 [0.019]  -0.037 [0.018]* 
May-84  0.061 [0.026]**  0.044 [0.020]*  0.017 [0.021] 
Nov-84  -0.008 [0.024]  0.018 [0.014]  -0.026 [0.017] 
May-85  -0.009 [0.023]  0.012 [0.010]  -0.021 [0.021]   18 
Nov-85  0.015 [0.018]  -0.01 [0.011]  0.025 [0.014] 
May-95  0.004 [0.023]  -0.003 [0.011]  0.007 [0.020] 
Oct-95  0.022 [0.020]  0 [0.009]  0.023 [0.018] 
May-96  -0.015 [0.023]  -0.007 [0.007]  -0.008 [0.022] 
Oct-96  0.018 [0.019]  -0.003 [0.006]  0.021 [0.018] 
May-97  -0.033 [0.020]  0.002 [0.009]  -0.035 [0.018] 
Oct-97  -0.034 [0.024]  -0.018 [0.013]  -0.015 [0.021] 
May-98  -0.049 [0.017]**  -0.016 [0.008]  -0.033 [0.015]* 
Oct-98  -0.032 [0.017]  -0.002 [0.008]  -0.031 [0.014]* 
May-99  -0.032 [0.021]  -0.004 [0.012]  -0.028 [0.019] 
Oct-99  -0.005 [0.020]  0 [0.010]  -0.005 [0.018] 
Oct-99  -0.004 [0.029]  -0.006 [0.017]  0.001 [0.028] 
*Significant at 5%, **Significant at 1%        
Table 11. Difference in Probability Before and After the Treatment for Control Group (Informal 
Sector) 
Overall  a  closer  look  at  Table 19  suggests  that  the  minimum  wage  hikes  have  provoked  more 
disemployment effect on the late 1990’s than in the early 1980’s. This effect is stronger for the pooled 
sample, than for any of the separately sample we have investigated. Transitions to the informal sector or 
to self-employment were rarely significant for both sample periods. It seems that assessing the quality of 
the control group is a good way to avoid misleading results when evaluating the effect of minimum wage 
increase on employment transitions. From this section, we could conclude that several of our difference-
in-difference  matching  estimates  that  seemed  to  lead  to  a  positive  effect  of  the  minimum  wage  on 
transitions  to  nonemployment  were  due  to  significant  changes  in  the  transition  probabilities  of  the 
comparison group. Whether this is due to spill-over effects or different reaction between treated and 
comparison  group  to  simultaneous  macroeconomic  shocks  is  not  clear.  More  research  is  needed  to 
disentangle these two effects.  
 
   Nonemployment Unemployment Inactivity Informality 
Self-
Employment 
Kernel                
Pooled sample                
Oct-96 YES            
May-97 YES            
Oct-98 YES            
Formal sector                
May-82             YES 
Oct-96 YES           YES 
Oct-97          YES(-)   
Informal sector                
Oct-98 YES             
Table 12. Summary of the Effect of the Minimum Wage Hikes 
7. Conclusion 
This paper aimed to evaluate the effect of several episodical minimum wage increases on employment 
transitions in the early 1980’s and late 1990’s in Brazil. We evaluate this effect for the pooled sample of 
formal and informal workers and for each group separately. We emphasize the need to incorporate the 
informal sector in the analysis for two reasons. First, due to possible dynamics effects of minimum wage 
hikes on the wage of informal sector workers as highlighted in Welch (1974) and Mincer (1976) models. 
Second due to the well-documented increase in the importance of the minimum wage in the determination   19 
of wage or wage increases for informal sector workers. Thus minimum wage hikes are quite likely to 
affect the employment transition of informal sector workers either because of (indirect) dynamic effects 
or because of the informal indexation of the informal sector wages to the minimum wage.  
We estimate the effect of the minimum wage hike using difference-in-differences in a parametric way 
(via probit) and in a non-parametric way (via propensity score matching). To define treated and control 
groups in the baseline period that was used as contrast (in the difference-in-differences) for the actual 
minimum wage increase we defined pseudo-experiments both before (in the previous month) and after the 
minimum wage increase
37 (5 months later).  
For  the  pooled  sample  we  only  find  evidences  of  disemployment  effects  for  some  of  the  episodical 
increases of the late 1990’s. According to the probit estimates this occurred in 1996 and 1998 when the 
pair September/October is used as control. The kernel matching indicates that the increase in transitions 
to  nonemployment  was  significant  in  1996  for  the  pair  September/October,  in  1997  for  the  pair 
March/April and in 1998 for the pair September/October
38. As for the formal sector, the results are in line 
with the probit estimates, there is no disemployment effect on the early 1980’s regardless of the method 
used. For the late 1990’s only the kernel matching point to a positive and significant effect in 1996 when 
the pair September/October is used as contrast. We also find no strong evidence that minimum wage 
hikes  led  to  transitions  to  informality  or  to  self-employment.  As  for  the  informal  sector,  the  probit 
estimates are quite similar to the estimates for the pooled sample, indicating disemployment effects in 
1996  and  1998  and  no  effect  on  the  early  1980’s.  The  kernel  matching  only  shows  significant 
disemployment effects in 1998 (when the pair September/October is used) whereas the NN matching 
indicates significant disemployment effects in 1997 (when the pair March/April is used) and in May 
1983.  
All in all it seems that the probit estimates and the two propensity score matching do not diverge very 
much in their estimates. The results indicate that the minimum wage hikes were more likely to have 
disemployment effects in the late 1990’s. These results suggest that the wage indexation of the early 
1980’s avoided the disemployment effect of the minimum wage as long as it affected the whole wage 
distribution
39.  However, one puzzling result refers to the minimum wage increase of May 1995. The 
increase in the real value of the minimum wage observed in that date should make disemployment effects 
more likely to be found in that episode. However, all estimates point to a negative (but statistically 
insignificant) effect on transitions to nonemployment for that year
40. One possible explanation for this 
result is that the minimum wage was so low before that increase that it was not binding for formal and 
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